Someone on the Google Wargames BB (https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical) posted this 2006 article from HistoryNet.
I found it interesting to read as the author used evidence to rebut that Kursk wasn't the huge defeat that some other authors have claimed.
`As a result, one of the best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly. Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses.`
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm
That's a very interesting viewpoint, certainly gives food for thought.
That battle pretty much broke the back of the southern fronts tank force. Another day or two and the panzers would have been running amok in soviet rear areas.
Manstein in his memoirs called it a huge mistake. the operation was much in contrast to all Blitzkrieg principles: the soviets got plenty of time to prepare and dug in, the operation was a pretty obvious move and there was no element of surprise.
One of the questions is if Hitler had not insisted on waiting for the brigade of Panthers to be ready. The battle would have started several weeks earlier and given the Russians less time to prepare, plus, because the Panthers had not been proven in action, they had little impact on the battle.
Quote from: WallysWorld on July 14, 2013, 05:28:50 PM
Someone on the Google Wargames BB (https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical) posted this 2006 article from HistoryNet.
I found it interesting to read as the author used evidence to rebut that Kursk wasn't the huge defeat that some other authors have claimed.
`As a result, one of the best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly. Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses.`
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm
Absolutely. If the Allies landed a week later in Sicily, the Kursk offensive would have lasted longer, with who knows what results.
I regularly whip Soviet ass at Prohorovka playing East Front.
Quote from: bob48 on July 22, 2013, 04:29:56 PM
One of the questions is if Hitler had not insisted on waiting for the brigade of Panthers to be ready. The battle would have started several weeks earlier and given the Russians less time to prepare, plus, because the Panthers had not been proven in action, they had little impact on the battle.
bit of Kursk trivia... the commander of the Panther brigade got sick the day before the ballon went up and he was replaced with an officer that had no armor experience at all. that genius then proceeded to run his Panthers across minefields with no infantry support. :o not that 150+ Panthers would have had any effect on things.... ::)
Those early Panthers were the Ausf D with the glass drive train. IIRC, two days after the battle started over 75% of them were out of commission.
The (later) Panther Ausf A's and G's were the beasts that out-tigered even the Tiger Tanks during the last 1-2 years of WW2.
ya.. 75% were out of action due more to command idiocy then Soviet fire.
Quote from: Staggerwing on July 22, 2013, 07:44:48 PM
Those early Panthers were the Ausf D with the glass drive train. IIRC, two days after the battle started over 75% of them were out of commission.
The (later) Panther Ausf A's and G's were the beasts that out-tigered even the Tiger Tanks during the last 1-2 years of WW2.
The Auf.G Panther really was the business. Also the Auf.D did not have the 'chin mantlet' and there proved to be a shot-trap between the turret and the hull.
Strange that the models were D,A then G. Also, since the Tiger was first into production, why was it not Pz V instead of VI?
One interesting aspect that I remember reading is that if Panthers had been produced intead of Tiger I and II's, a great many more would have been produced (in proportion to the number of Tigers produced). Since there were not really a great number of Tigers acually produced, the larger number of Panther
could have had a greater impact. Only speculation perhaps, but interesting nevertheless.
Quote from: bob48 on July 23, 2013, 06:21:11 AM
The Auf.G Panther really was the busness. Also the Auf.D did not have the 'chin mantlet' and there proved to be a shot-trap between the turret and the hull.
The Panther's long 75mm cannon actually had better penetrating power than the short 88 on the Tiger I due to the former's higher muzzle velocity. The 88 shell carried more explosive though.
Quote
Strange that the models were D,A then G. Also, since the Tiger was first into production, why was it not Pz V instead of VI?
One interesting aspect that I remember reading is that if Panthers had been produced intead of Tiger I and II's, a great many more would have been produced (in proportion to the number of Tigers produced). Since there were not really a great number of Tigers acually produced, the larger number of Panther could have had a greater impact. Only speculation perhaps, but interesting nevertheless.
The Panther II was almost in production near war's end. The Germans had started that project early on as soon as the first Panthers started deploying.
The II had better armor and used a much smaller, round mantlet that eliminated the shot trap almost entirely. It would have been a real beast and much better than wasting production on Tiger Is and IIs.
Having said all that, the physiological impact that the relatively small number of Tigers had (especially on the Western Front) was out of proportion to the number of vehicles actually employed, where any tank spotted became a 'Tiger' to Allied troops.
Quote from: bob48 on July 23, 2013, 06:21:11 AM
One interesting aspect that I remember reading is that if Panthers had been produced intead of Tiger I and II's, a great many more would have been produced (in proportion to the number of Tigers produced). Since there were not really a great number of Tigers acually produced, the larger number of Panther could have had a greater impact. Only speculation perhaps, but interesting nevertheless.
Speculation, but relevant speculation.
Germany made a number of mistakes that made it more difficult for them to win, but one of their more significant ones was their obsession with changing production. The Panzer III got to what? Model J? Then they made the Pz IV, then the Pz VI, then the Pz V. All of which were over-engineered, none of which shared many common components.
When the Allies' strategic bombing campaign started to bite having too many production facilities making too many specialized parts was a recipe for disaster. Production and logistics ain't sexy, but they make a big difference when fighting wars.
A neat little story by Arthur C. Clarke which manages to tell the tale: http://www.mayofamily.com/RLM/txt_Clarke_Superiority.html
Very relevent. I do not remember ever reading that before.
With the exception of a few SPG types, such as the Wespe / Hummel, the Germans would have been far better off switching all tank production to the Panther and Jagd panther. Even older models, such as Pz III / IV would have been better converted to SP types, such as StuGs / Hummels / Nashorns.
I cannot remember reading any accounts of vehicles such as the Sturm Tiger (of which there were only about 14 produced from damaged vehicles) or the SturmPz IV having any impact on any battle. Even the JpPz IV was recorded as being a very awkward vehicle to maneuver due to its being 'nose-heavy' because of the overhang of the 75mm L70 gun (as fitted to the Panther).
Both the Luch (Lynx) and Puma were excellent recon vehicles, and if the same logic that produced the sdkfz 234 series had been applied to the Panther, then maybe the Allies would have had a much more difficult time of it.
Neither the M4 or the T34 were the greatest tanks in the world, but they were produced in mass, and were relatively cheap to produce. If the Allies had been able to provide a greater number of Sherman Fireflies and 76.2mm armed vehicles, one can imagine that tank warefare in NW Europe would been much tougher for the Germans and given Allied tank crews more confidence and a greater chance of survivability.
Consider the effect of the T34/85, SU85 / SU100 had on the Eastern front. A basic design that could be adapted to provided multiple variants, with an effective weapon and that could be produced in large numbers.
Quote from: bob48 on July 23, 2013, 10:10:41 AM
I cannot remember reading any accounts of vehicles such as the Sturm Tiger (of which there were only about 14 produced from damaged vehicles) or the SturmPz IV having any impact on any battle. Even the JpPz IV was recorded as being a very awkward vehicle to maneuver due to its being 'nose-heavy' because of the overhang of the 75mm L70 gun (as fitted to the Panther).
I read Otto Carius' memiors a couple of years back. Late in the war he was given some kind of tank destroyer. I never quite figured out if it was a JdPz IV or a Jagdpanther. He claimed the sighting device was so fragile that the tank had to be driven with the gun locked down until just immediately before engagement. Problem was, to unlock the gun, someone had to jump out of the tank move to the front of the vehicle, and take down the locking bar.
Whoops.
Needless to say, he wasn't a big fan of that idea.
Quote from: LongBlade on July 23, 2013, 11:06:34 AM
Quote from: bob48 on July 23, 2013, 10:10:41 AM
I cannot remember reading any accounts of vehicles such as the Sturm Tiger (of which there were only about 14 produced from damaged vehicles) or the SturmPz IV having any impact on any battle. Even the JpPz IV was recorded as being a very awkward vehicle to maneuver due to its being 'nose-heavy' because of the overhang of the 75mm L70 gun (as fitted to the Panther).
I read Otto Carius' memiors a couple of years back. Late in the war he was given some kind of tank destroyer. I never quite figured out if it was a JdPz IV or a Jagdpanther. He claimed the sighting device was so fragile that the tank had to be driven with the gun locked down until just immediately before engagement. Problem was, to unlock the gun, someone had to jump out of the tank move to the front of the vehicle, and take down the locking bar.
Whoops.
Needless to say, he wasn't a big fan of that idea.
The Jagd Panther did not have a travel lock on the glacis plate, whereas some models of the JgPz IV did, so I guess that would be what he was refering to. An interesting fact is that late models of the JgPz IV can be recognised by looking at the front bogie wheels, which will have steel tyres. It was found that the rubber ones wore out very quickly because of the excesive weight at the front as mention before. The vehicle aslo had a nick-name; 'Guderian Enten' which I think translates roughly as 'hoax'.
Im pretty sure Carius had a Jadgtiger by wars end.
put this on your wish lists:
http://www.rzm.com/books/fp/citadel.cfm
http://www.rzm.com/books/fp/fp076.cfm
http://www.rzm.com/books/fp/zitadelle.cfm
Oh no, as if there wasn't enough books on my wish list already!
I have them and they are quite excellent! however $100 books are for special occasions. 8)
"Kursk:The German View" by Steven Newton and "Decision in the Ukraine" by George Nipe are some thought provoking books about why the battle of Kursk was fought eventhough the Germans knew that the Russians were aware of when and where the attack was going to take place and why the Germans eventually called off the battle when it seemed liked they were on the brink of accomplishing their objectives.
Both these books I think are still available and able to be Googled and read on the internet.
I got a PDF copy of "Kursk the German View" off the internet and google books gives a pretty good amount of reading for the "Decision in the Ukraine" book.
While the invasion of Sicily played a small part in calling off the attack in the Kursk bulge,there were also other Soviet offensives being conducted along the entire length of the east front at this time that were drawing German reserves away from the Kursk salient,which in turn caused the Germans to alter their whole strategy from then on and for the duration of the war in Russia in the Summer of 43 from an offensive to defensive posture.
I don't think even if the Germans had won the battle of Kursk it would have had very much of a long lasting impact on the war in Russia.
The Germans were already scraping the bottom of their manpower pool even before the Kursk offensive.I also think at this time the German generals already knew the war was lost and the tide had completely turned in the Allied favor and the best they could hope for was to sue for peace.But as long as Hitler was in power that was never going to happen.
So,in the end period of the war just making their eventual defeat as costly as possible to the Allied armies arrayed against them was the only option left open to the German generals.
Interesting stuff. Was the problem with German weapons that they were too advanced and therefore lacking in quantity, that they were overengineered (and thus too hard to maintain in the field), or both?
The story by Clarke is interesting, but it focuses almost entirely on the technical aspects of such things. It really overlooks the dynamic feedback loop between technology and doctrine.
I've grown increasingly intrigued by books that detail the doctrines used in fighting WW II. Parshall & Tully's Shattered Sword gives a fascinating glimpse into various doctrines for each side (damage control, reconnaissance functions, carrier air group ops, etc.). And Bergerud's Fire in the Sky gives an even more detailed account of the evolution of informal airfighting doctrine in the South Pacific from 1941-1943. Both are among the best WW II books that I've read in recent years.
Does anybody know of other such books that pay significant attention to the evolution of doctrine (of any sort) during WW II?
Quote from: FarAway Sooner on August 29, 2013, 08:49:04 PM
Interesting stuff. Was the problem with German weapons that they were too advanced and therefore lacking in quantity, that they were overengineered (and thus too hard to maintain in the field), or both?
All of the above. The complexity and overengineered aspect of their equipment made them even more vulnerable to logistics problems.
The Allied strategic bombing campaign concentrated on logistical choke points like railroad yards, bridges, et al. We hammered those choke points quite thoroughly, and when a Pz V needs a 50 different widgets than a Pz IV, which has another 50 different from a Pz VI...it becomes a serious problem keeping all those tanks in good repair. Nevermind the fact that that we were doing our best to destroy them through the conventional means of attacking them on the battlefield.
The Germans never had a chance if World domination was their ultimate aim.
The best they could have hoped for was a stalemate and only if they were able to knock the British and Russia out of the war before the United States became fully involved.
The Allied powers had already determined that Germany would lose the war it was only a question of when ,which is why the only option the Allies offered Germany was unconditional surrender.
There was absolutely know way the Germans could have triumphed over the combined economic might of both the U.S. and USSR.I don't even think if the Germans had developed the A-Bomb first it would have mattered.
Hitler and his band of morons bit off far more than they could chew and would have done well by themselves to have never ventured into Poland.